Restructuring and transformation are not the same activity.
Restructuring changes an organisation’s cost base. Transformation changes the economics that produced that cost base in the first place. UK higher education is currently doing a great deal of the former while describing it as the latter, and the difference is about to matter a lot to governing bodies.
The scale of restructuring under way is without modern precedent. Across 90 published 2024-25 accounts analysed by Times Higher Education, universities spent £303.3 million on compensation for loss of office — a 71% increase in a single year and almost triple the 2022-23 figure. Roughly 13,300 people took severance from that sample alone, on top of 9,290 and 6,960 in the two preceding years. Close to 30,000 roles in three years.
Much of that was necessary. An institution facing serious financial pressure should reduce its cost base, and reducing it is not a failure of ambition. The problem is what we have started calling it.
What restructuring in Higher Education actually changes
Taking 15% of a workforce is not transformation. Having a programme is not transformation. Buying technology is not transformation.
The distinction is simple, and it sits in the question being asked. When you restructure, you ask where cost can be taken out. When you transform, you ask why that cost exists at all.
Consider a function of a hundred people that becomes a function of eighty. Money has been saved and the saving is real. But if those eighty people are still re-keying the same data, passing it through the same approvals, reconciling the same spreadsheets, working around the same systems and handling the same exceptions, nothing has been transformed. There are fewer people doing the same badly designed work, usually under more pressure than before.
That is a saving. It should be reported as a saving. It is not a different operating model.
The paradox: cutting the capability you need to change
There is a harder version of this problem, and it is the one that compounds.
When money gets tight, the budgets that tend to go first are training, change capability, data capability, programme capacity, and specialist skills. In other words, the capability an institution needs in order to transform. The organisation improves today’s position by weakening tomorrow’s ability to change.
Six months later it finds it cannot do the work it needs to do. So, it either does not do the work, or it buys the capability back externally, usually at a premium. That is not a saving. That is cost-changing address, moving from pay to procurement and often increasing on the way.
Why technology debt becomes financial debt
Technology behaves the same way, and more expensively.
An institution defers replacing an ageing platform because cash is tight. Entirely understandable. But the old platform is not free. People are still needed to reconcile its data. Teams still maintain its integrations. Specialists still keep it alive. Manual work continues, and processes stay fragmented.
The savings show up in the capital budget, and the cost reappears in operations. Jisc estimates that duplication, maintenance and workarounds associated with outdated, customised and poorly integrated systems could cost UK higher education between £2 billion and £4.7 billion annually. Deferred technology decisions do not disappear. They convert into operating cost, and eventually technology debt becomes financial debt.
How a board can tell which one it is approving
The test is not whether an institution has a transformation strategy. Nearly every institution has one. The test is what the work leaves behind.
A governing body reviewing a completed programme should not stop at whether the saving was delivered. The more useful questions are these. What is actually different? Which service or experience improved, and for whom? Which processes disappeared entirely, rather than being automated in place? Which systems were switched off? What did the institution stop doing?
And the one that separates the two activities completely: what benefit can still be demonstrated twelve months after go-live?
If the honest answer is that there are fewer people, that is a saving, and it may well have been the right decision. It is simply not transformation, and a board that cannot tell the difference cannot tell whether the institution is becoming more resilient or merely smaller.
Transformation leaves evidence behind. Restructuring leaves a lower headcount. Both can be the correct choice. Only one of them changes the economics.


